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Dispossession by ‘Development’:
Corporations, Elites and NGOs in
Bangladesh
Abu Ahasan and Katy Gardner
1 Agricultural land in Bangladesh is disappearing fast.  World Bank figures show a drop
from 77.1% of the country’s total land area being given over to agriculture in 1990 to
72.2% in 2000 and 70.12% in 2011. Add to this the wetlands and natural lakes or haors
(areas which seasonally flood and are treated as commons and used for fishing) which are
rapidly being filled for building or privatised for shrimp cultivation and it is clear that
there are seismic changes underway. What processes are involved? As in other parts of
South  Asia,  researchers  have  pointed  to  a  mixture  of  corrupt  governance,  hyper
development  and  criminal entrepreneurialism  (Geisler  &  Feldman 2012,  Adnan 2013).
More  generally  scholars  across  South  Asia  have  documented  how  elites,  criminal
entrepreneurs,  property speculators  and corrupt  governments  work together  in land
expropriation, often taking Harvey’s theory of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (2003) as a
starting point. (Adnan 2013, Misra 2011, Münster & Münster 2012, Walker 2008, Münster
& Strümpell 2014, Levien 2011). Yet whilst this work points to the interplay between the
state, local political elites and ‘crony capitalism’ (Geisler & Feldman 2012) so far there has
been less discussion of the role of Western-based multinationals (MNCs). For example,
although  valuable  research  shows  how  Special  Economic  Zones  are  associated  with
rampant property speculation and entrepreneurship, leading to the dispossession of the
peasantry by a rentier class (Levien 2011), the sometimes contradictory mechanisms used
by  multinationals  which  benefit  from  the  newly  released  land  have  attracted  less
attention (though see Cross 2014).
2 In the following article, based around two case studies of extractive MNCs in Bangladesh,
we show how these formed shifting alliances with NGOs as well as the state and local
elites in order to gain a ‘social license to operate’ (Prono & Slocombe 2012, Kirsch 2014).
As  this  implies,  it  would be simplistic  to  understand ‘accumulation by dispossession’
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solely in terms of a state-corporate nexus, or indeed to portray the ‘locals’ as sharing the
same agenda, or necessarily unwilling to participate in processes of land speculation and
industrialisation (cf. Cross 2014, Hall 2011). As we shall see, the reality is more complex. In
both cases the MNCs worked through local and national political networks, often treading
a difficult path through the contradictory interests of the different groups. Both also
drew  upon  powerful  discourses  of  ‘development’  in  order  to  justify  their  presence,
discourses which resonated with local and national aspirations for modernity. A notable
strategy in this context was the contracting out of projects of community development to
NGOs, which added ethical respectability to the MNCs and, in the first case, acted as a
buffer between the local population and the corporation. Indeed, as has been noted in
other parts of the world where extractive industries have followed similar tactics, NGOs
are increasingly drawn into the state-corporate nexus, even when violent dispossession is
involved (Welker 2009, 2014, Zalik 2005). Welker describes how in Indonesia, for example,
the Newmont mining company supported local elites who ran NGOs in the name of CSR
and then violently attacked other groups who protested against the mine (Welker 2009,
2014). In this and other cases, researchers have described how discourses of ‘corporate
social  responsibility’,  ‘partnership’  and  ‘development’  mask  and  or  legitimise  the
extraction of resources by the corporation. Clearly, whilst Harvey is correct to point out
the role that the state-corporate nexus plays in land appropriation, we need to go further,
considering also the role of local elites, NGOs and other agencies.
3 In what follows we attempt to unravel some of the contradictions as well as describe the
shifting  interests  and alliances  involved.  In  the  first  case,  the  American corporation
Chevron gained access to approximately 60 acres of farming land in order to construct
and operate a huge gas plant which was inaugurated in 2007 in Bibiyana, Habiganj. In the
second, the multinational company JT accessed soil, land and water for its construction
materials production plant in Dumki, Sylhet. Both corporations sidestepped the actual
process of land appropriation, either by leaving its forcible acquisition to the government
(in Bibiyana) or by turning soil into a commodity (in Dumki). Both also used the promise
of  development  either  via  projects  of  improvement  and/or  by  encouraging  the
anticipation of industrialisation and new economic opportunities as a means to pacify
local  resistance.  To  this  extent,  dispossession  is  not  an  unintended  consequence  of
development (development by dispossession). Rather, the promise of development emerges,
whether intentionally or not, as a means to dispossess (dispossession by ‘development’). In
both cases the corporations gained the support of local elites by offering developmental
gifts and contracts for supplying labour and raw materials; these elites in turn helped to
repress  local  conflict  and  allow  the  change  in  land  use  to  take  place.  Finally,  and
significantly, both attempted to co-opt national NGOs. The research on which this paper
is based was, in the Chevron study, a mixture of participant observation, interviews and
detailed case studies of household coping strategies, carried out by Katy Gardner, Zahir
Ahmed, Masud Rana and Fatema Bashar and funded by the ESRC-DFID. Interviews took
place amongst  transnational  villages in Bangladesh and the UK,  amongst  low-income
households in the villages concerned and amongst Chevron staff in Dhaka. In the Dumki
case,  qualitative  research  was  carried  out  by  Abu  Ahsan,  Raniya  Shams  and  Marup
Hossain from BRAC. This entailed interviews with people involved in the project, famers
and  landowners,  fishermen,  local  activists,  journalists,  politicians,  businessmen,
contractors,  JT  management  and  security  staff,  group  discussions  with  villagers  and
observation of various sites in Dumki. A few more interviews took place in Dhaka with
BRAC and JT staff. Information on JT was also gathered from extensive desk research.
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Before turning to our cases in more detail, let us start by briefly outlining the historical
background to what Karim has described as ‘the shadow state’ of NGOs in Bangladesh
(Karim 2011: xviii).
 
The ‘Shadow State’: A brief history of NGOs in
Bangladesh
4 Bangladesh complicates the standard concept of clearly demarcated states, civil society
and  private  sectors.  Since  the  country  was  formed  in  1971,  the  NGO  sector  has
experienced phenomenal growth, evolution and diversification, delivering public goods
to such an extent that Rehman Sobhan (1997) has forecast an erosion of state sovereignty.
This role developed in the aftermath of the war of independence from Pakistan, a time
when much of  the country’s  infrastructure was destroyed,  poverty was rampant and
Henry Kissinger infamously referred to the country as a ‘bottomless basket case’ (White
1999: 307). In this early period NGOs were predominantly focussed on rural poverty. Over
the 1970s two of the country’s leading NGOs, BRAC and the Grameen Bank, had been
experimenting  with  a  cooperative  approach  to  rural  community  development.  The
assumption of a cohesive village society was,  however,  fractured. In the late 1970s,  a
BRAC initiated study,  The Net:  Power  Structure  in  Ten Villages,  reported on widespread
corruption  and  exploitation  in  the  programmes  (BRAC 1980).  Disillusioned  by  the
cooperative  model,  the  Grameen  Bank  began  to  work  exclusively  with  poor  women
through  a  model  of  collateral  free  small  credit.  Meanwhile  other  pioneering  NGOs,
including BRAC and PROSHIKA, used Paolo Freire’s theory of ‘conscientisation’ as a source
of inspiration for critical literacy programmes. The language and appeal of activism drew
numerous  left  leaning  university  graduates  to  these  NGOs.  Along  with  small-scale
economic activities, skill training, and collateral free credit, young educated NGO field
organisers carried out critical literacy—an iterative educational method to evoke critical
reflections and political  consciousness among its  participants.  This led to some early
successes in which landless people accessed khas (government owned) land or common
property,  though  challenges  were  to  follow  from  both  local  elites  and  the  state
(Rafi 2003).
5 By  the  mid-1980s,  international  aid  had  shifted  its  focus  away  from  the  politics  of
mobilisation towards market participation as the route to empowerment (Kabeer 2003).
NGO leaders  also found themselves  increasingly integrated into the international  aid
industry,  with  its  demands  for  efficiency,  cost  effectiveness  and  sustainability
(Feldman 2003). This was also the period of World Bank and IMF structural adjustment, in
which  the  country  was  undergoing  reforms  aimed  at  trade  liberalisation,
denationalisation and privatisation. In 1990 Ershad was removed by a popular student-led
democracy movement and the pace of neoliberal reform programmes accelerated. Donors
invested heavily  in  micro credit  and emphasised ‘partnership’  between corporations,
government, big NGOs, small NGOs, CBOs, local elites and ‘the community’ (Lewis 2004).
During this  period,  the amount of  international  aid coming to NGOs ‘ballooned from
roughly [US]$150 million in 1990 to nearly [US]$450 million in 1995, the peak year of the
decade to 2000’ (Stiles 2002: 837). Relying on the microfinance infrastructure, some of the
pioneering NGOs scaled up massively  whilst  small-scale  NGOs mushroomed,  covering
almost all of the country’s many thousand villages. The private sector was also booming,
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with  the  rapid  expansion  of  the  garment  sector  plus  the  arrival  of  MNCs  in
telecommunication, energy and Banking.
6 During the late 2000s, the Grameen Bank focussed on profit, constantly reinventing its
financial  package,  as  did  BRAC,  Asa  and  others  in  what  was  becoming  a  highly
competitive  and sophisticated  credit  market.  BRAC also  invested  heavily in  the  new
private  sector,  including  ventures  in  commercial  banking,  clothing,  IT,  a  private
university and the food industry. Today BRAC is the biggest provider of employment after
the government (Smillie 2009). In the late 2000s it extended its reach to Africa, Asia and
Latin America,  whilst  in 2006 the Nobel  peace prize went  to Muhammad Yunus,  the
founder of the Grameen Bank. Meanwhile, Bangladesh outperformed India and Pakistan
in a number of key social indicators including life expectancy, health, infant mortality,
education and women’s development (Sen 2013). The World Bank reports that Bangladesh
had graduated from being a lower income country to a lower-middle income country. By
the late 2000s financial viability had become crucial for NGOs, especially in a time when
donor funding was shrinking. The private sector and CSR is therefore an increasingly
important source of funding for NGOs, as is the new emphasis on ‘social enterprise’ and
‘social business’. It is from this context that ‘partnerships’ with corporations keen to push
their agendas of ‘corporate social responsibility’ take place. Let us return to our case
studies.
 
Chevron in Bibiyana
7 We start with Chevron in Bibiyana, North East Bangladesh, where land appropriation
between 2005-and 2007 enabled the company’s construction and operation of a large gas
field. The land was forcibly acquired by the government and then leased back to the
corporation. While distancing the corporation from threatened state violence, Chevron
had  to  negotiate  carefully  with  a  variety  of  state  and  non-state  actors  in  order  to
construct and operate the plant, allying themselves with members of the local elite to
whom they offered development gifts and contracts and enlisting reputable NGOs to carry
out  projects  of  community  development.  All  the  while,  however,  their  presence  was
dependent upon their relationship to the state and, in turn, the land acquisitions that the
state  enforced.  Indeed,  the  process  of  land  acquisition  was  expedited  when  the
corporation’s  representatives  negotiated  a  higher  rate  of  compensation  with  the
government.  Their  successful  navigation  through these  tricky  alliances  and ethically
contradictory positions has led to the corporation’s current position as the largest gas
producer and foreign investor in Bangladesh.
8 The  Bibiyana  gas  field  is  situated  on  paddy  land  between  four  populous  villages  in
Habiganj, Greater Sylhet, an area with high levels of transnational migration to the U.K.,
which has been described elsewhere by Gardner (e.g. 1995, 2008, 2012). When natural gas
was discovered in the early 2000s the contract for extracting the gas was granted by the
government to the energy company Unocal, or ULB. A smaller gas field had already been
built by Occidental in the late 1990s a few kilometres away, but this was to be far larger,
using 60 acres of prime agricultural land for the actual gas field, plus much more for the
pipeline and high banked roads that would connect the gas fields (or ‘pads’) to each other
and to the main road. Given the intense use of agricultural land in the area, and the value
put on it both by absent landlords in the UK and those using it in the desh (home), it was
immediately apparent that there would be opposition.
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9 Given the local  opposition to the land loss,  how was the corporation to manage the
contradiction of compliance with global moralities of ethical business practice, yet also
gain access to the land? In 2005 the District Commissioner announced that the land would
be forcibly acquired by the government,  at  a rate of  approximately one-tenth of  the
market  value  (Reyes  &  Begum 2005: 26).  According  to  accounts  gathered  during  the
research,  local  people  were  swiftly  mobilised  by  local  leaders  against  the  operation,
presenting a united front between and within the affected villages. Although much of the
land was owned by a relatively small group of elite families who had members living in
the UK (known locally as Londonis), poorer households either sharecropped or worked on
it as agricultural labourers; any net loss of land thus impacted negatively on what were
already precarious agricultural livelihoods (Gardner 2012).  Crucially,  those leading the
protests,  the Londoni landowners, were patrons to land poor and landless households,
providing shahajo (‘help’, charity) to many in times of crisis. Political support given to
their patrons was necessary to the survival of many of these households (Gardner 1995,
see also Wood 2003).
10 As the protest movement grew in size there were marches and road blockades, leading to
the eventual halting of construction. The police were quick to respond: the gas field was a
major project for the BNP government and they were keen that Unocal complete the
building by 2007. Here the government faced its own contradiction. Whilst nationally the
presence of extractive multinationals was highly controversial, with national uproar over
planned open-plan mining by Asia  Energy at  Phulbari (see  Nuremowla 2011 and this
volume,  Gain 2006),  few  disputed  the  need  for  energy  security  (cf.  Islam  et al. 2008,
Wesley 2006). By 2008–11 this had become pressing; power shortages were hampering the
industry which had motored Bangladesh’s growth rate of 6.6 % (in the first part of 2010).
Meanwhile, the leaders of the two main parties, the BNP and the Awami League, shifted
their positions according to whether or not they were in power. In an account given by
one of the leading lights of the National Committee to Protect Oil, Gas, Mineral Resources,
Power and Ports (a Dhaka based protest group against extractive MNCs), Sheikh Hasina,
the leader of the Awami League, was supportive of their movement whilst in opposition
to the BNP before 2008, but quickly changed tactics after the Awami League came to
power in 2008, acting to suppress anti-MNC protests in Dhaka that year.
11 Meanwhile, in Bibiyana in 2005 armed police escorts were provided for company and
government  officials  and  violence  threatened.  In  a  visit  to  the  area  the  District
Commissioner reminded local people that in similar situations in Bangladesh, troops had
been  called  in  and  publically  threatened  to  have  the  leaders  arrested  (Reyes  &
Begum 2005).  During  the  research  conducted  in  2009–11,  informants  talked  of  the
beatings and arrests that took place in 2005. In another story the researchers were told
how one of the local activists was taken in the night by the Rapid Action Battalion to their
base in Habiganj,  thus severely compromising Unocal’s attempts to build ‘community
relations’.1 As  this  story  implies,  the  relationship  between  MNCs  and national
governments can be difficult to negotiate: whilst Unocal had to gain access to the land it
was not in their interest for local leaders,  with whom they were attempting to build
relationships, to be arrested. Whilst needing to avoid the financial and political costs of
failing to complete construction on time, the corporation did not wish to be associated
with the dirty stuff of everyday governance in Bangladesh, for this could damage both
their local and their global reputation. In a report commissioned by consultants tasked to
advise Unocal on improving community relations, they are cautioned to:
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Ensure that  company related vehicles  and other infra-structure are not  used to
commit human rights abuses […] the company reputation is directly linked to the
reputation  of  the  user,  or  how  the  vehicles  are  used.  For  example,  several
companies currently face court cases (in criminal court)  because ‘their’  vehicles
were used by the police or army to commit human rights abuses […] (Begum &
Reyes 2005: 24).
12 Just as MNCs cannot control the governments in the countries where they work, neither
are  all  their  employees  necessarily  working  towards  the  same  agenda.  Community
Relations staff may, for example, have particular aims and objectives or views of ‘the
community’ that are not shared by their colleagues in Security. In another section of the
report, a ‘senior UBL staff member’ is quoted as saying: ‘Unocal is really the David here
and the people are Goliath. If they stand up and demand something in protest they have
all the power’ (Reyes & Begum 2005: 8). While from the perspective of local people such a
view of power relations verges on the ludicrous, it is worth noting the potential threat
that local activism was deemed to pose during this period.
13 Although there is  no evidence that  Unocal  condoned the use of  violence against  the
activists, they accepted the use of police escorts for their visits to the area and provided
accommodation  for  a  specially  assigned  police  force,  a  tactic  that  indicates  the
prioritising of ‘security’ over human rights considerations. As the Reyes & Begum report
states:
UBL (Unocal) has agreed to provide barracks,  located 7 km from the site,  and a
vehicle for a special police contingent assigned to the area. While such support is
not  unusual,  there  is  always  a  risk  that,  in  the  event  of  the  use  of  force,  the
company will be associated with any abuses. For example, threats of violence have
already been applied. In addition, one high ranking official told us there is no space
in the land acquisition process for human rights considerations, and UBL admits to
‘having no control over the police […]’ (2005: 23, emphasis added).
If state threats of violence were risky for Unocal’s reputation, other government tactics
had hidden costs for the company. Many of the accounts collected during the research
indicate that pressure was put on union parishad level BNP (Bangladesh National Party,
which was in power during the research) leaders to stop their opposition to the plant by
high ranking BNP members. As Reyes & Begum report:
people are aware that pressure was applied by BNP government officials at very
high levels  to the local  BNP leader who organised the community protests.  The
resulting perception is that UBL is aligned to the ruling party (2005: 6).
14 As the protest movement was gathering force, those responsible for community relations
in  Unocal  were  keen to  present  a  ‘smiling  face’  to  the  locals  (Shever 2010).  Holding
meetings in which grievances were aired was one way to do this, as advised by the Reyes
& Begum report. Another was the distribution of appeasing gifts, including, in these early
days of community relations, T-shirts for children, sweets and building materials offered
to  poor  people  whose  houses  had  been  damaged  in  recent  floods  (Gardner 2012).
Crucially,  the company also became involved in negotiations with the government to
increase the rate of compensation for land, correctly identifying this as the key issue for
the leaders of the protest who as landowners had the most to lose financially. When they
were successful, persuading the government to offer rates at market value, some of the
mainstays  of  the  activism  became  less  confrontational,  realising  that  land  loss  was
inevitable  and  they  should  take  what  was  offered.  As  those  leaders  withdrew  their
support for the protest movement, they started to persuade others to stop too.
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15 The company’s success in negotiating the price of land upwards was boosted by their
strategy to expedite the compensation process. Recognising that if left to the inefficient
and corrupt government land offices, landowners might not receive payment in time or
would have to pay large bribes, the company installed mobile land offices in the vicinity
and in 2009 reported to us that 95% of all  claims had been settled.  This is  what the
company state in their 2007 Corporate Social Responsibility Report:
During the Bibiyana Project’s development more than two hundred meetings were
held  with  community  members  to  understand  their  concerns  and  explain  the
project’s  impacts  and  benefits.  Residents  were  surveyed  to  understand  their
perceptions of the project and relations were built with local leaders, communities
and non-government organisations.
Considered a cultural and economic asset in Bangladesh, land was important to the
project’s  development.  Chevron  took  steps  to  mitigate  the  impact  of  land
acquisitions  and leases  by  building the  pipeline  without  displacing  people  from
their homes. Also, five temporary offices were located along the pipeline route to
help  landowners  register  their  deeds,  secure  payment  from the  authorities  and
answer questions about the project.2
As this implies,  by 2007 Chevron had taken over from Unocal,  the companies having
merged in 2005. One effect of this merger is that past mistakes and problems could be
blamed on Unocal whilst Chevron appeared to be doing things better, even though the
actual personnel on the ground were the same. For example,  during the research an
official responsible for community relations mentioned that Unocal had made ‘a lot of
mistakes’, which Chevron had now put right. What he didn’t mention was that he was the
person in charge of community relations during Unocal’s time: when the merger took
place, he had stayed in post.
16 Having  expedited  the  land  compensation  process,  Chevron  set  to  work  offering  the
surrounding communities a range of development programmes. Whilst accounts of the
negotiations over this period differ, with some informants reporting that the company
originally pledged to provide much more, the promises of community development were
an additional reason why some of the leaders changed tactics and now negotiated with,
rather than activated against,  the company. In addition to development goods, which
they presided over, their relationship with Chevron officials also led to contracts for the
supply of labour and building materials. Meanwhile, for Chevron the objective was for the
company to present itself as ethical, socially responsible, and ‘partners’ with the local
people whose land had been lost and livelihoods damaged (Gardner 2012, Gardner et al
. 2012). As stated in the 2007 CSR report:
We told them that we were more interested to know about where their strength lay,
what their capacities were, before we set out to address their needs. Our goal was
always to forge a partnership with the local community to play a part in the overall
development of the community.3
Partnership with various well-known NGOs was another component of the community
development programs. The Sylheti NGO Friends in Village Development Bangladesh was
funded to carry out a programme of  ‘Alternative Livelihood Programmes’,  whilst  the
Smiling  Sun  Franchise  of  Health  Clinics  was  responsible  for  two  clinics.4 A  further
programme of  stipends  and scholarships  for  school  children was  also  funded by the
company. The strategy was about more than simply gaining community compliance, or a
‘social  license  to  operate’  (Prono  & Slocombe 2012).  It  was  also  aimed  at  creating  a
particular  image  of  Chevron,  or  rebranding  the  company  for  local  and  national
consumption. This was done in part by buying into the good reputation of the NGOs,
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whose logos were displayed prominently beside that of Chevron, thus creating an image
of an ethical and caring company working for the good of local people. Whilst road signs
featuring  children  or  madrasa  students  wearing  Chevron  hard  hats  and  reminding
drivers to take care to mark out ‘Chevron territory’ (cf. Yeh 2013, also Ferguson 2005),
other signage displayed prominently outside the clinics or sites of other good works (a
‘friendship bridge’, or FIVDB’s offices) are marked with the Chevron logo. Meanwhile,
researchers noted how NGO fieldworkers, rather than Chevron employees, tended to be in
the  frontline  of  complaints  from local  people  concerning  the  gas  field  and Chevron
(Gardner et al. 2012).
17 Whilst in its public statements the company stressed ‘partnership’ with NGOs, the degree
of equality of this partnership is debateable. For example, in an event funded by the
research project held in Dhaka in which the role of CSR in Bangladesh was discussed in
2011,  the  NGOs funded by Chevron showed PowerPoint  slides  concerning their  good
works in the area, whilst those not funded by the company and members of other civil
society organisations were highly critical, giving the impression that the event was stage-
managed by Chevron. Meanwhile, the leaders who had formed alliances with Chevron
met with varying success. While some made money by becoming labour contractors and
/  or  headed  the  ‘Village  Development  Organisations’  that  oversaw  the  provision  of
development goods, several described how they were unable to match local expectations
of the largess they should offer and came under severe criticism from their supplicants,
leading to a reduction rather than an increase in status and political power. As one man
explained:
Of all the demands we made to Chevron, we achieved about 5%. Our fellow villagers
started insulting us because we hadn’t achieved their demands. They became very
suspicious, saying that we’d been ‘bought’ by Chevron and were no longer looking
out for their interests. I suppose the reason for these suspicions is that I’m working
as a contractor for Chevron, so people think I’m their man, not a man of the people.
Through my tree planting project I can hire a few women labourers, but not much
more, so everyone’s dissatisfied with me. Their demands are so high, but I can’t
recruit 100 people, only 15… (field notes 2009).
As  the  leaders  and  NGOs  who  had  formed  alliances  with  Chevron  faced  a  negative
backlash from the local population, Chevron were able to sidestep confrontation since
they were now working through these intermediaries, their ‘partners’. While the road
ahead remained strewn with  difficulties—the  company’s  policy  of  bringing  labourers
from outside was to lead to more protests in 2013/2014 when the gas field expanded—for
now at least they had successfully gained a social license to operate.
18 It would be wrong to deduce from this account that NGOs are necessarily willing partners
with corporations. Let us turn to our second case study, in which the corporation ‘JT’
attempted to form a partnership with one of Bangladesh’s biggest NGOs, BRAC. Here we
see a similar set of corporate techniques which, on the one hand use discourses of the
‘value of land’ and development and seek alliances with national NGOs and on the other
hand assist  local  elites  in  their  pursuit  of  resource  appropriation.  This  two pronged
strategy  took  place  in  Dumki  (a  pseudonym),  a  haor5 region  in  Sylhet  in  Northeast
Bangladesh, where the JT industry plant is located.
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JT in Dumki, Sylhet
19 JT,  a European  multinational  company  specialising  in  building  materials  production,
offered the NGO BRAC to be its CSR partner in the ‘Dumki Uplifting Project’. Written by
international consultants in engineering vocabulary, a fifty page report laid out a large-
scale  landscape  engineering  plan.  This  involved  construction  of  artificial  lakes  and
embankments in the wetland. It was intended to supply the plant’s raw material—clay—
but  also  to  set  up  an  aqua-agricultural  farming  system,  which  would  generate
employment and uplift the lives and livelihoods of affected people. This was presented as
a scientific solution to land scarcity in Bangladesh, poverty in the haor region, and a way
of meeting the increasing demand for raw materials on which the country’s development
rested. JT applied for government approval with this plan and invited BRAC to initiate
community mobilisation on the proposed project. Partnership with a reputed NGO was
also seen as constructive in getting government approval. In the post-2000 NGO scene in
Bangladesh, CSR projects are taken as a potential source of funding, as aid donor funding
has  been  shrinking  along  with  the  rise  of  the  private  sector.6 In-mid  2013,  BRAC’s
Research and Evaluation Division (RED) carried out field research in Dumki to investigate
community perceptions of the proposed project. Soon after their arrival in the field, the
researchers learned that the project was primarily to do with land appropriation. The
following account is based on this research. We use pseudonyms to conceal the identity of
the corporation in question, the name of the proposed project and the project area to
maintain anonymity and confidentiality as part of the agreement with BRAC.
20 We start with an analysis of the project report.7 Comparing this with our field data, we
realised how the report left out crucial information to portray the project area in a way
that would fit into their plans for resource extraction in the area. As James Ferguson has
demonstrated in Lesotho, the project narratives were produced to provide a charter for
intervention, becoming the perfect ‘anti politics machine’ (Ferguson 1990). The second
part  of  the  case  study  shows  the  expectations  of  connection  and  experiences  of
disconnection that characterise the local population’s relationship with JT (cf. Gardner
2012). Then, we discuss how JT, in spite of failing to secure government clearance and
partnership with BRAC, was able to access raw materials by offering contracts to local
elites  (cf.  Geenen  &  Honke 2012,  Welker 2009).  What  is  interesting  in  these  myriad
processes  is  the  centrality  of  development—as  a  discourse,  or  bribe—through  which
multinational corporations attempt to forge alliances with states, NGOs and local elites
and extract mineral resources.
21 The ‘Dumki Uplifting Project’ arose from JT’s decision to switch to clay from shale as a
raw material for manufacturing. For the first few years the industry relied on imported
shale, but as this became gradually more expensive and difficult to access the company
saw  a  cheaper  solution  in  clay,  which  they  thought  they  could  excavate  from  the
perceived backwater of Dumki.  Before laying out the landscape engineering plan, the
report discussed the problems of the project area. Dumki, an area of nearly three hundred
hectares, was presented as ‘less productive, isolated and impoverished’. (JT 2011: 5) This
was due, the report claimed, to the very characteristics of haor agro-ecological systems
—‘early flash floods’, ‘a prolonged monsoon limiting livelihood opportunity in only wild-
catch fishing (is possible)’; ‘mostly uncultivable land’, ‘poor yield one crop production’,
and ‘low input based agricultural practices’ (JT 2011: 5–8). Therefore, the farmers and
Dispossession by ‘Development’: Corporations, Elites and NGOs in Bangladesh
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 13 | 2016
9
owners in Dumki were not getting ‘expected benefits from the land’, the report claimed (JT
2011: 9, emphasis added).
22 Large-scale  infrastructure  projects  such  as  building  embankments  are  not  new  in
Bangladesh.  Indeed,  as a number of studies point out,  this approach to flood control
remains the single most important factor for large-scale displacement of people in the
country (Zaman 1996). It is interesting to note that although ‘extracting’ clay was its main
focus,  ‘uplifting’  remained  the  most  used  term  in  the  project  report  outlining  its
‘Sustainable Mining’  (JT 2011: 8).  The use of  such oxymorons,  as  the anthropology of
extractive industries identifies, is one of the main strategies of corporate elites, used to
conceal  the harm caused by mining to  people  and the environment,  to  manage and
neutralise critique (Kirsch 2010: 2014).
23 During their field visit researchers found the land at Dumki to be much more productive
and meaningful to the villagers than implied in the project report. Although the whole
project area was represented as ‘low-lying and flood prone’ (JT 2011: 8), a large chunk of
land was found to be elevated, as a result of sedimentation. The majority of villagers
identified themselves with agricultural livelihoods. Although a large segment of land in
Dumki yields only one crop a year, a significant portion yields two and some three. In
addition, the silt deposited by annual floods constantly increases the haor’s soil fertility
level, leading to higher crop yields. The return from boro rice is much higher in haor areas
than the national average, and can be achieved without the use of fertilisers (Alam &
Islam 2010).
24 Crucially, the report ignored local patterns of landownership and neglected to detail the
various ways in which land and water were held commonly, providing a vital resource for
poorer people. Landownership in Dumki is dominated by a few hundred medium and
small  owners  spanning  at  least  seven  villages.  A  section  of  Dumki  comprised  of
government owned (Khas) land and Jolmohal. The literal meaning of Jolmohal is water (jol)
area (mohal). This can be a section of river, floodplains, land depressions or an individual
pond  owned  by  the  government.  It  is  the  policy  of  the  Bangladesh  government  to
distribute  Khas-land  and  Jolmohal to  marginalised  populations  with  the  objective  of
redressing social disparities (Barkat et al. 2000). The Jolmohal in Dumki was leased out to
the  local  mosque  committee  through  which  local  landless  and  sharecroppers  were
engaged in fisheries. In the dry season, the vast swath of Khas-land is used by farmers for
grazing  their  animals.  This  turns  into  wetland  in  monsoon,  a  common resource  for
villagers, a crucial aspect of haor lives and livelihoods.
25 As the BRAC researchers showed glossy visuals of the ‘Dumki Uplifting Project’ to a group
of villagers, they were met with anger: ‘We will not sell our land to JT’, they were told.
‘We  will  not  let  the  government  lease  its  Khas-land  for  this  project’;  ‘It’s  not  a
development  project,  but  a  trick  to  steal  our  land’  (fieldwork,  May  9,  2013).Yet
understanding the history of the JT industry plant through the perspectives of Dumki’s
inhabitants allows us to see how large-scale infrastructure projects are built upon, as
Cross puts it, an ‘economy of anticipation’ (Cross 2014).
26 In the wake of the new millennium, the news of JT’s investment excited the nation. It was
one of the largest foreign investments in the industrial sector, which matched with the
country’s booming real  estate market.  The construction of  JT’s gigantic plant and an
impressive  cross  border  convenor,  which supplied its  essential  raw ingredients  from
India,  was a testament to the industrial  and developmental  ambitions of  Bangladesh.
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Villagers in Dumki shared these dreams. They expected formal employment, electricity
and gas connections, bridges, roads, high schools, colleges, hospitals.
27 JT bought the land to build its plant from a few wealthy villagers. Many villagers worked
as labourers in the construction phase. A community centre was built, in between the
plant  and  Dumki,  to  run  development  activities  such  as  primary  education,  basic
healthcare and vocational training.  These ‘gifts’  from JT were welcome, but after the
construction only a handful of locals were given permanent employment in the plant. As
in Bibiyana, villagers claimed that the company had a deliberate policy to not recruit
locals (see also Cross 2009, Gardner 2012, Gardner et al. 2012). Locals demanded that the
company hire their people. Seeing no response, they protested against the company’s
recruitment policy, but learned that their complaints were not being heard beyond the
hired  contractors,  field  organisers  and  security  guards.  The  real  decision-makers
remained  outside  of  their  reach,  inaccessible  and  unapproachable.  Meanwhile  those
living close to the plant suffered physically from environmental hazards caused by
factory smoke and dust. Researchers were shown trees in their homesteads which could
no longer bear fruit due to air pollution. These families remained uncompensated. A few
years ago,  JT decided to block the muddy road surrounding its  plant  through which
villagers accessed the river port. The company had to retreat from this decision in the
face  of  protest.  Meanwhile,  JT  wanted  to  lease  Khas-land  and  Jolmohal  from  the
government to extract the clay. This was also met with local resistance. In an interview a
farmer remarked with irony, ‘once we were told that JT’s investment would make our
area as developed as Singapore!’ (fieldwork, May 15, 2013). In spite of expectations of
social  mobility  and  modernity,  the  majority  of  villagers  stayed  behind,  ‘physically,
culturally and economically disconnected’ from their hoped source of capital (Gardner
2012: 44).
28 In the face of  ongoing opposition JT followed a similar strategy to Chevron,  offering
contracts to local elites, who then effectively co-opted the resistance. Some of the most
influential political elites in the Upazila and district levels were offered contracts; the
contractors then convinced individuals to sell soil from their land, which they then sold
to JT at disproportionately higher prices. It’s important to note that these contractors are
buying soil not land, thus avoiding the problem of land acquisition. The practice of soil
extraction  has  brought  about  adverse  socio-economic,  environmental  and  political
effects.  The BRAC researchers were taken to several  excavated plots.  These not  only
become unusable after a few years but risk causing the erosion of adjacent land, which,
village activists told us,  may force the owners to sell  them cheap to the contractors.
Frustration is rising amongst those trying to preserve their land as their attempts to
appeal to higher authorities such as the Environmental Ministry are failing. The village
activists,  who once displayed tremendous unity against JT,  feel  incapable of  stopping
individual community members from selling their soil.  Tensions emerge from within,
diminishing the strength of collective decision-making capacity and united resistance as
individuals  sell  their  land  and  move  away.  JT’s  tactic  of  outsourcing  clay  supply  is
fracturing the political  as well  as physical  landscape of Dumki as clay piles up in its
compound.
29 Ahmed, Union Parishad Chairman, is such a contractor. He is a strong man of the ruling
party.  When researchers  met  him in  his  office,  he  was  telling  his  followers  how to
confront opposition. In 2013 Bangladesh saw a peak of political turmoil as the national
election was approaching. In interview, Ahmed accepted the fact that soil extraction was
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damaging Dumki, but he said his role was only nominal. He instead pointed to the bigger
players and blamed JT for failing to maintain good relations with the locals.
30 During  the  democratic  era  in  Bangladesh,  party  politics  has  become an increasingly
important means for gaining access to key resources, services and goods. The overlap
between political party activity and mastaan (musclemen) activity dominates the struggle
for  valued  resources.  Whilst  in  Bibiyana  the  elites  were  persuaded  to  stop  their
opposition to the gas field via political pressure from the government, an increased rate
of land compensation, and the opportunity of running development programmes and
becoming contractors for the corporation, in Dumki JT authorised soil subcontractors
were political entrepreneurs coming from both ruling and opposition political parties.
This explains why Dumki’s protest never received support from political organisations,
despite  many  promises.  In  a  country  which  is  dominated  by  a  bipolar  polity
(Sobhan 2004),  cultivating  relations  with  both  the  opposition  and  ruling  party  is  a
standard way of doing business. This strategy is particularly popular among real estate
companies for large-scale land appropriation. As Devine notes, ‘informal and sometimes
shadowy procedures and relationships have become the primary management mode of
the state. These informal relations are what really make things happen in Bangladesh’
(Devine 2007: 25). Thus we come across a situation where though the ‘Dumki Uplifting
Project’  had  to  be  halted  in  the  face  of  local  resistance,  the  company’s  outsourcing
strategy of hiring contractors from the local elite meant that organised protest gradually
lost its potency and direction. After reviewing the research BRAC declined the invitation
to work with JT on the project, forcing the corporation to rely on informal and shadowy
procedures as they failed to establish a formal partnership with state and NGO actors.
 
Conclusion: Dispossession by ‘Development’
31 Drawing upon evidence from South and South East  Asia,  Derek Hall  has argued that
Harvey’s theorisation of  ‘accumulation by dispossession’  is  somewhat simplistic in its
portrayal of a nexus of state-corporate interests that dispossess resistant rural peasants
(Hall 2011, 2013). Rather, landowners may be keen to speculate on their land and people
surrounding sites of  industrial  development or resource extraction may welcome the
‘development’ that the coming of the corporation heralds (Cross 2014). Indeed, nowadays
extractive MNCs routinely deploy promises not only of ‘uplift’ or new job opportunities
but  also  development  gifts  as  part  of  their  strategies  of  ‘community  engagement’
(Welker 2012, Rogers 2012, Shever 2010, Rajak 2011). This involves forming alliances with
a range of actors, including local elites and NGOs, leading the corporations to negotiate
difficult and contradictory relationships, especially when working alongside repressive or
corrupt states. Rather than the state simply clearing the way for MNCs to operate, the
negotiations and tactics involved can be highly complex and are not guaranteed to meet
with success.
32 In  order  to  illustrate  these  processes  in  this  article  we  have  briefly  described  the
strategies employed by two extractive MNCs in their operations in Bangladesh. In both
cases  the  MNCs  attempted  to  make  alliances  with  the  state,  NGOs,  and  local  elites,
offering potentially lucrative contracts to the latter in order to bring individuals who had
initially led opposition movements ‘on the side’. Whilst the relationship of both MNCs to
the state was central,  this  had to be carefully managed,  especially in Bibiyana when
forcible  acquisition  and  threatened  violence  compromised  the  corporation’s  ‘ethical
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business stance’.  Significantly both MNCs turned to national  NGOs to carry out their
community  development  programmes,  leading in  the  case  of  Bibiyana to  a  new and
potentially  compromising role  for  those  NGOs involved:  as  providers  of  programmes
working to a corporate agenda.
33 In  deploying  these  tactics,  the  MNCs  present  their  work  as  ethically  irreproachable;
according  to  them,  rather  than  presiding  over  dispossession  they  are  responsibly
contributing to  development,  empowerment  and ‘uplift’.  In  these  instances  the term
development dispossession refers not so much to the side effect of people losing land and
livelihoods as part of wider processes of development or urbanisation, but to the use of
discourses of development, in particular the tropes of ‘uplift’, ‘empowerment’ and ‘CSR’,
to  enable  dispossession  to  take  place.  Tellingly,  these  discourses  are  not  simply
impositions  consciously  created to  fool  people.  Instead they  chime with  widely  held
dreams of development and connection, shared by those producing the programmes as
well as those to whom they are offered. In Dumki, the people living on the outskirts of the
JT plant saw epochal changes in the local haor region, with their dreams and desired
futures turning to disconnections, losses and ruptures. Meanwhile, in Bibiyana, alliances
with the state and national NGOs helped pave the way for Chevron’s operations. In both
cases nationally respected NGOs were approached to carry out the good works, under the
banner of ‘partnership’.
34 Clearly, we have much to learn about the role of corporate capital in rural South Asia. In
particular, major questions are raised concerning NGOs tasked with supporting the poor
and  creating  community  ‘development’  whilst  accepting  funding  and  contracts  from
extractive MNCs. Whilst espousing ‘development’ these also aim, by definition, to profit
from the extraction of resources, often leading to environmental damage. By offering
contracts and patronage to local elites, they may also be exacerbating inequality. Whilst
unable to offer more than sketches in this brief article, we hope that the cases presented
here will stimulate more research.
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NOTES
1. The relationship between governments and oil  / mining companies is highly complex and
varies according to context. In Nigeria, for example, WikiLeaks have revealed documents that
show  that  Shell  inserted  staff  into  all  of  the  major  ministries  (http://www.guardian.co.uk/
business/2010/dec/08/wikileaks-cables-shell-nigeria-spying) accessed 5/4/11.
2. Chevron,  2007,  URL:  file:///C:/Users/GARDNERK/Documents/bibiana/
Chevron_CR_Report_2007.pdf
3. Chevron: Bibyana Gas Field, First Anniversary Report: 2008: 11.
4. http://healthmarketinnovations.org/program/smiling-sun-franchise-program-ssfp (accessed
26/05/14).
5. The  haors  are  large  saucer-shaped  flood  plain  depressions  located  mostly  in  Northeast
Bangladesh covering about 25% of the entire region. This inland freshwater wetland ecosystem is
enriched with aquatic biodiversity but can be prone to annual flash flood from rivers and high
rainfall compared to other parts of the country. Silt, deposited by annual floods, however, keeps
haor soil fertility high, leading to higher crop yields during the dry season.
6. Source: personal communication with Andrew Jenkins, BRAC’s Donor Liaison Officer.
7. ‘Dumki Uplifting Project’  (pseudonym) report was forwarded to BRAC in 2011. The date of
publication, however, was not mentioned in the report. Several original quotes from the report
have been used in the following paragraphs. Some words/terms from the quotes are emphasised
in italic by the author.
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ABSTRACTS
In this article, which is based around two case studies of extractive multinationals in Bangladesh
we show how the multinationals concerned worked with states, local elites and national NGOs in
order  to  gain  access  to  land  and  resources.  In  negotiating  these  complex  relationships  the
multinationals  often  found  themselves  in  potentially  contradictory  positions,  requiring  the
muscle of the state where land had to be forcibly acquired but also the partnership of national
NGOs in order to carry out development programmes as part of their policies of ‘community
engagement’  or  ‘uplift’.  As  this  implies,  whilst  the  state-corporate  nexus  is  central  to  land
appropriation in South Asia,  we must also consider the role of NGOs and other development
agencies,  especially  in  a  context  such as  Bangladesh where  NGOs have  taken on the  role  of
‘shadow state’ (Karim, 2011: xviii) . Indeed, the growing links between NGOs, private finance and
corporate interests requires urgent attention.
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